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Summary
The Iraq war was launched on March 19, 2003, with a strike against a location
where Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and top lieutenants were believed to be
meeting. On March 17, President Bush had given Saddam an ultimatum to leave the
country or face military conflict.  Although some resistance was encountered after
U.S. troops entered Iraq, all major Iraqi population centers had been brought under
U.S. control by April 14.   In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council
had adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its  the
disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.”  During January and
February 2003, a U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf intensified and  President
Bush, other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly
indicated that Iraq had little time left to offer full cooperation with U.N. weapons
inspectors.  However, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and China urged that the
inspections process be allowed more time. 
The Administration and its supporters assert that Iraq was in defiance of 17
Security Council resolutions requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).  Further delay in taking action against Iraq, they argued,
would have endangered national security and undermined U.S. credibility.  Skeptics,
including many foreign critics, maintained that the Administration was exaggerating
the Iraq threat and argued that the U.N. inspections process should have been
extended.  In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed
forces of the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed
by Iraq and to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). 
Analysts and officials are concerned about the risk of instability and ethnic
fragmentation in Iraq after the war.  U.S. plans for post-war governance of Iraq are
just starting to be implemented, and the role of the United Nations in administering,
if any, Iraq is still under debate.  Whether the overthrow of Iraq President Saddam
Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle East, or promote
instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is also an issue in debate.  The
Iraq war has created concerns over the humanitarian situation, particularly in
Baghdad and other cities affected by the war, but large-scale refugee flows have not
occurred.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization.  International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq and
the prospective occupation.  Estimates of the cost of a war in Iraq vary widely.  If
war or its aftermath leads to a spike in the price of oil, economic growth could slow,
but oil prices have fluctuated widely during the conflict to date.  Conceivably, global
oil production could increase significantly after the war.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues.  See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report.  This report also provides
links to other sources of information and is updated once a week.
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Most Recent Developments
For a day-by-day update on Iraq-related developments, including military
developments, see CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Daily
Developments [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs/iraqdaily.shtml].
Purpose of This Report
The Background section of this report outlines the evolution of the conflict
with Iraq since September 11, 2001.  This section is followed by a more detailed
description and analysis of U.S. policy and a survey of congressional actions on Iraq.
The report then reviews a range of issues that the Iraq situation has raised for
Congress.  These issue discussions have been written by CRS experts, and contact
information is provided for congressional readers seeking additional information.  In
this section and elsewhere, text boxes list CRS products that provide in-depth
information on the topics under discussion or on related topics.  The final section
links the reader to additional sources of information on the Iraq crisis.  For a list of
CRS reports related to Iraq, see CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S.
Confrontation [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
This report will be updated once each week while the Iraq crisis continues.
Background
Bush Administration concerns about Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President Bush
named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil” nations in his January 2002
State of the Union address.  Vice President Cheney, in two August 2002 speeches,
accused  Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons of mass destruction to
dominate the Middle East and threaten U.S. oil supplies.1  These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States might soon act unilaterally against Iraq.  However,
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Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
in a September 12, 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President
Bush pledged to work with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common
challenge” posed by Iraq.2  H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on
October 16, authorized the use of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s
efforts to obtain prompt Security Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with U.N.
resolutions.  On November 8, 2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging,
adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the
disarmament obligations imposed under previous resolutions, or face “serious
consequences.”
Prelude to War.  During January-March 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the
Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts speculated that mid- to late March seemed a
likely time for an attack to be launched.  Officials maintained that it would be
possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of summer, but military experts
observed that conditions for fighting a war would be far better in the cooler months
before May. Statements by President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and other
top officials during January, February,
and March expressed a high degree of
dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance
with Security Council disarmament
demands. The President said on
January 14, that “time is running out”
for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was
“sick and tired” of its “games and
deceptions.”3  On January 26, 2003,
Secretary of State Powell told the
World Economic Forum, meeting in
D a v o s ,  S w i t z e r l a n d ,  t h a t
“multilateralism cannot be an excuse
for inaction” and that the United
States “continues to reserve our
sovereign right to take military action
against Iraq alone or in a coalition of
the willing.”
President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the
Union Address on January 28, 2003.  “With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the
region.”  The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours
may lie ahead.”  Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” the Al Qaeda terrorist
organization, the President also condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt”
for the United Nations and the world.  On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State
Powell detailed to the United Nations Security Council what he described as Iraq’s
“web of lies” in denying that it has weapons of mass destruction programs. On
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February 26, President Bush gave a major address on Iraq.  He said that the end of
Hussein’s regime would “deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron .... And other
regimes will be given a  clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated.”
The President returned to an earlier Administration theme in declaring that post-
Hussein Iraq would be turned into a democracy, which would inspire reform in other
Middle Eastern states.  (For analysis of the issues raised by the President, see below,
The Administration; Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues; Post-War
Governance Issues; and Implications for the Middle East.)
Final Diplomatic Efforts.  Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international
support for an early armed confrontation remained limited.  President Jacques Chirac
of France was a leading critic of the U.S. approach while the Iraq issue remained
before the U.N. Security Council, maintaining that he was not convinced by the
evidence presented by Secretary of State Powell.  On February 10, at a press
conference in Paris with President Putin of Russia, Chirac said “nothing today
justifies war.” Speaking of weapons of mass destruction, Chirac added “I have no
evidence that these weapons exist in Iraq.”4  France, Germany, and Russia advocated
a strengthened inspections regime rather than an early armed conflict with Iraq, and
China took a similar position. 
On February 24, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain
introduced what was called a “second resolution” at the U.N. Security Council,
stating that Iraq had failed “to take the final opportunity afforded to it by Resolution
1441” to disarm.  The proposed resolution was regarded as authorizing the immediate
use of force to disarm Iraq.  On March 10, President Chirac said that his government
would veto the resolution, and Russian officials said that their government would
likely follow the same course. 
Chirac’s stance, and the Administration’s lack of success in garnering other
support for the “second resolution,” seemed to convince U.S. officials that further
diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would prove fruitless.  President Bush flew
to the Azores for a hastily-arranged meeting with the prime ministers of Britain and
Spain on Sunday, March 16, 2003.  The meeting resulted in a pledge by the three
leaders to establish a unified, free, and prosperous Iraq under a representative
government.  At a press conference after the meeting, President Bush stated that
“Tomorrow is the day that we will determine whether or not democracy can work.”
On March 17, the three governments announced that they were withdrawing the
proposed Security Council resolution,  and President Bush went on television at 8:00
p.m. (EST) that evening to declare that unless Saddam Hussein fled Iraq within 48
hours, the result would be “military conflict, commenced at the time of our own
choosing.”  The war began on the night of March 19, with an aerial attack against a
location where Saddam Hussein was suspected to be meeting with top Iraqi officials.
U.S. and British troops entered Iraq on March 20, and while the invasion encountered
resistance, particularly in its early stages, U.S. forces had largely gained control of
Baghdad, the capital, by April 9.  The northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul fell shortly
afterward, and on April 14, U.S. troops entered Tikrit, Saddam’s birthplace and the
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9 “Poll: More Say War Justified without Finding Weapons,” Washington Post, April 5, 2003.
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11 One columnist deplores the protests for “shortsightedness and moral hypocrisy,” but at
the same time expresses concern about their long-term consequences.  Robert Samuelson,
“The Gulf or World Opinion,” Washington Post, March 27, 2003. 
last major population center outside coalition control.  (For information and analysis
related to the war itself, see below, Military Issues.)
Public Reactions.  In mid-January 2003, polls showed that a majority of
Americans wanted the support of allies before the United States launched a war
against Iraq.  The polls shifted on this point after the State of the Union message,
with a majority coming to favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval.5  Polls
shifted further in the Administration’s direction following Secretary Powell’s
February 5 presentation to the Security Council.6  Although subsequent polls showed
some slippage in support for a war, President Bush’s speech on the evening of March
17 rallied public support once again.  A Washington Post-ABC News  poll taken just
afterward, showed that 71% supported war with Iraq and that 66% supported the
President’s decision not to seek a U.N. Security Council vote.7  With the fighting
underway, polls show that more than seven in ten Americans continue to support the
war,8 and Washington Post-ABC News polling finds that 69% feel that the right
decision was made even if no weapons of mass destruction are found in Iraq.9
Nonetheless, many Americans oppose the war, and large anti-war demonstrations
took place in several cities on the weekend of March 15-16, followed by sharp
protests in San Francisco and a large demonstration in New York after the fighting
began.  Major anti-war demonstrations had also occurred on the weekends of January
19-20 and February 15-16, and there have been demonstrations in support of
Administration policy as well.
Many reports have noted that U.S. policy on Iraq has led to a rise in anti-
Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls show strong
opposition to a war with Iraq,10 and in the Middle East.  Demonstrations against the
war in European cities on February 15-16 were widely described as “massive,” and,
as in the United States, large demonstrations also took place on March 15-16.  Large
demonstrations were reported in many cities worldwide after the fighting began, and
efforts to launch boycotts of U.S. products are underway in some countries.  Some
observers dismiss  foreign protests as of little lasting significance, but others argue
that rising anti-Americanism could complicate U.S. diplomacy in the years ahead.11
Secretary of State Powell has said in an interview that the United States will seek to
change foreign perceptions of U.S. policy by supporting a significant role for the
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United Nations in post-war Iraq, “aggressively” restarting the Arab-Israeli peace
process,12 and reaching out to “friends with whom we may have been having some
difficulty.”13 (For further discussion, see below, Diplomatic Issues).  Some reports
suggest that European opposition to the war is moderating in light of the successful
overthrow of the Iraqi dictator, and the welcome given to coalition troops in some
places.14  At the same time, many Europeans are concerned by images of disorder in




(Last updated April 14, 2003)
On March 17, 2003, as noted above in Background, President Bush addressed
the American people and announced that Iraq would face conflict with the United
States if Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, did not leave Iraq within 48
hours.   On March 19, 2003, after the expiration of the 48-hour ultimatum, President
Bush told the American people that military operations against Iraq had been
authorized, and the effort began that evening.   On April 11, 2003, two days after
Iraq’s regime had fallen from power in Baghdad, President Bush said he would
declare a U.S. victory when U.S. military commanders tell him that all U.S. war
objectives had been achieved. 
In making its case for confronting Iraq, the Bush Administration characterized
the regime of Saddam Hussein in  Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States
and to peace and security in the Middle East region.  The Administration maintained
that the Iraqi regime harbored active weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs
that could be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s long-term goal of dominating the
Middle East.  These weapons, according to the Administration, could be used directly
against the United States, or they could be transferred to terrorist groups such as Al
Qaeda.  The Administration said that the United States could not wait until Iraq made
further progress on WMD to confront Iraq, since Iraq could then be stronger and the
United States might have fewer military and diplomatic options.  
In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically
since the September 11, 2001 attacks that the Baghdad regime supported and had ties
to the Al Qaeda organization and other terrorist groups.  According to the
Administration, Iraq provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it
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construct chemical weapons.  A faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked
to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-Islam, had been in contact with the Iraqi regime,
according to the Administration.  The Ansar base near Khurmal was captured by
coalition forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Other experts are said to believe
that there might have been some cooperation when Osama bin Laden was based in
Sudan in the early 1990s but that any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off after bin
Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and went to Afghanistan.  Bin Laden issued
a statement of solidarity with the Iraqi people on February 12, exhorting them to
resist any U.S. attack.  Secretary of State Powell cited the tape as evidence of an Iraq-
Al Qaeda alliance, although bin Laden was highly critical of Saddam Hussein in the
statement, calling his Baath Party regime “socialist” and  “infidel.”  
In attempting to win international support for its policy, the Administration
asserted that Iraq was in material breach of 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions –
including Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 - mandating that Iraq fully declare
and eliminate its WMD programs.  A number of U.S. allies and Security Council
members, including France, Germany, Russia, and China agreed that Iraq did not
fully comply with Resolution 1441, but opposed military action, maintaining instead
that  U.N. inspections were working to disarm Iraq and should have been continued.
 Diplomatic negotiations to avert war ended after the United States and Britain could
not muster sufficient support for a proposed U.N. Security Council resolution that
would have authorized force if Iraq did not meet a final deadline for Iraq to fully
comply with WMD disarmament mandates.
The Bush Administration’s September 2002 decision to seek a U.N. umbrella
for the confrontation with Iraq led officials to mute their prior declarations that the
goal of U.S. policy was to change Iraq’s regime.  The purpose of downplaying this
goal may have been to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that
argued that regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution.   The United States
drew little separation between regime change and disarmament: the Administration
believes that a friendly government in Baghdad is required to ensure complete
elimination of Iraq’s WMD.   As the U.N. option drew to a close, the Administration
again stressed regime change as a specific goal of a U.S.-led war, and some argue
that the President’s ultimatum that Saddam and his sons leave Iraq indicates that the
regime change goal was paramount.  Since the war began, senior officials have
stressed the goal of liberating the Iraqi people and downplayed the hunt for alleged
WMD stockpiles.  
Policy Debate.  Several press accounts indicate that there were divisions
within the Administration on whether to launch war against Iraq, and some of these
divisions might be re-emerging in post-war Iraq.   Secretary of State Powell had been
said to typify those in the Administration who believed that a long-term program of
unfettered weapons inspections could have succeeded in containing the WMD threat
from Iraq.15   He reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through
the United Nations to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm voluntarily.  However,
after January 2003, Secretary Powell insisted that Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully
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with the latest weapons inspections indicated that inspections would not succeed in
disarming Iraq and that war would be required, with or without U.N. authorization.
Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, among others, were consistently skeptical that inspections could
significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in
favor of U.S. military action against Iraq.  These and other U.S. officials reportedly
believe that the overthrow of  Saddam Hussein will likely pave the way for
democracy not only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for
terrorism.  In a speech before the American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003,
President Bush said that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States could
lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East and a settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute. 
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31756, Iraq: The Debate over U.S. Policy.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and  U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated April 15, 2003)
As the United States conducts Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the regime
of Saddam Hussein, Members of Congress have expressed their utmost support for
U.S. military forces in the region and for their families at home.  On March 20, 2003,
the House of Representatives, by a vote of 392 in favor to 11 opposed,  passed
H.Con.Res. 104, a resolution that expressed the support and appreciation of the
nation for the President and the members of the armed forces who are participating
in Operation Iraqi Freedom. That same day, the Senate passed a similar resolution,
S.Res. 95 by a vote of  99-0.  Since the beginning of the war, Administration officials
have been regularly briefing some Members of Congress on the progress of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In the weeks and months ahead, Congress will likely be
looking at issues related to the rebuilding of Iraq.
Background.  Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played
an active role in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force
it into compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted
aid and trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international
sanctions against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s
regime from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place.  In
1991, Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces
from Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
(P.L. 102-1).
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On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq.  The resolution conferred broad authority
on the President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.”  The resolution expressed
congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Recent Legislation. After the start of the war, the House of Representatives
passed H.Con.Res. 118, a resolution condemning Iraq’s failure to observe
international rules on the treatment of prisoners of war.  The House also passed
H.Res. 153, a resolution that recognizes the “need for public prayer and fasting in
order to secure the blessings and protection of Providence for the people of the
United States and our Armed Forces during the conflict in Iraq and under the threat
of terrorism at home.”  In addition, the Senate has passed S.Con.Res. 30, a resolution
of gratitude to nations that are partners of the United States in its action against Iraq
and S. 718, the Troops Phone Home Act of 2003, a bill that would provide a monthly
allotment of free telephone time to U.S. troops serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Indirectly related to the war in Iraq, both houses of Congress passed the Armed
Forces Tax Fairness Act (H.R. 1307), a bill that authorizes tax relief to members of
the armed services and their families. On April 3, 2003, both the House and the
Senate approved supplemental funding measures (H.R. 1559 and S. 762 respectively)
to provide financing for military operations in Iraq, economic aid for foreign
governments, and support for homeland security. On April 12, 2003, the House
approved the conference report on H.R. 1559.  The Senate had deemed H.R. 1559 to
be passed once the report was accepted by the House.  
A number of other resolutions on the Iraq war may or may not see floor action
in the weeks ahead. H.Res.198 urges France, Germany, and Russia to help create a
governmentally administered debt forgiveness program to assist Iraq in its
reconstruction. S.876 would require public disclosure of noncompetitive contracting
for the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Iraq. H.R. 1828 calls on Syria to “halt
its support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of
weapons of mass destruction, and cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil and illegal
shipments of weapons and other military items to Iraq.” Finally, S.Con.Res. 34,
H.Con.Res. 143, and H.Res. 203 call for the persecution of Iraq’s former leaders for
war crimes. 
Options for the Future. With the anticipated transition of Operation Iraqi
Freedom  from a military to a reconstruction phase, Congress has asserted its
oversight authority over post-war funding, placing requirements on how
supplemental appropriations should be spent. Although H.R. 1559 was one of the
largest supplemental appropriations bills ever, some analysts believe that the costs
of rebuilding Iraq will require Congress to appropriate additional funds in the months
ahead. Others believe that international organizations and foreign nations should
make considerable contributions to the post-war rebuilding effort. At the
international level, several Members recently submitted a letter to President Bush,
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expressing their support for widening the role of the international community in
helping to rebuild Iraq. The letter noted that by engaging the United Nations at this
time, the United States could help bridge rifts in our international relationships while
“strengthening ties with our allies as we continue in the war against international
terrorism.”16 Based on the initial phases of the conflict, it appears that, in the short
term, significant portions of Iraq will be dependent on humanitarian aid from the
United States and the international community, as well as significant numbers of
police and military forces to maintain civil order.
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As of April 13, after 25 days of operations, coalition forces are in relative
control of all major Iraqi cities and oilfields.  Iraqi political and military leadership
has disintegrated, though few of Saddam’s officials have been captured  Though
sporadic firefights continue, the major challenge to coalition forces is now the
restoration of civil order and the provision basic services to the urban population.  As
the U.S. ground offensive approached Baghdad, Department of Defense (DOD)
civilian leadership came under criticism for not permitting the deployment of
sufficient U.S. ground forces to maintain the offensive, protect lines of supply, and
secure rear areas where sporadic Iraqi resistance continues.  With the fall of Baghdad,
Mosul, and Kirkuk, this criticism has muted.  There has been no use of chemical or
biological (CB)weapons, and no confirmed CB weapons caches have been found.
DOD reports coalition casualties to date are 108 killed in action and 399 wounded
in action.
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Figure 2.  Map of Iraq
CENTCOM has pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers
when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance.  CENTCOM
spokesmen have characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields
and port facilities in southern Iraq have been secured, as have two air bases in
western Iraq.  Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has
been no widespread environmental sabotage.  Allied forces have not encountered the
mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign; however DOD reports that over
6,000 Iraqis have been taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply
deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen,
have engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but have
reportedly not inflicted significant damage.  The frequency of such attacks has now
declined significantly.  Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid
to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly
around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and
Basra. The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia population in southern
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Iraq was slow in developing, but now greater cooperation is forthcoming throughout
Iraq, despite some outbreaks of factional fighting.
Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry
out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq.  However, Special operations forces,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish
irregulars have now seized Mosul and Kirkuk. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in
the north has been excellent. Even a  mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish
vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, has not adversely
affected this cooperation.  Potentially complicating the situation in the north, has
been the Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed
in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence
the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq.  Turkish miliary
spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at
this time.  The U.S. has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing
Mosul and Kirkuk will be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops.
With the onset of widespread looting and some breakdown of public services
(electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces are confronted with the challenges
of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations have
ceased.  Though U.S. forces have come under some criticism for not having done
more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one,
particularly when an important objective is winning popular support.  Harsh reactions
risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of
coalition forces to maintain order.  The situation is further complicated by continuing
small-scale attacks on coalition troops in relatively secure areas.  Increased patrols,
the return of many Iraqi policemen to duty, and the emergence of civilian “watch
groups” are assisting what appears to be a natural abatement of looting.  In addition
to looting, coalition forces will also have to ensure that factional violence  and
retribution against former government supporters do not derail stabilization efforts.
With combat operations still on-going in some areas, and U.S. forces spread
relatively thin throughout Iraq, it is clear that the addition of troops, (e.g. the 4th
Infantry moving in from Kuwait) could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization
operations.
The United States continues its  build-up of ground forces in the Persian Gulf
region and other locations within operational range of Iraq.  The Department of
Defense has released limited official information on these deployments; but press
leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of the troop movements
underway.  The statistics provided below, unless otherwise noted,  are not confirmed
by DOD and should be considered approximate. The number of U.S. personnel
deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore and afloat) reportedly exceeds
340,000.
Additional units that have been alerted for deployment, and elements of which
have begun to transit, include the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, and
1st Mechanized Division.  The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division, originally intended
to attack through Turkey, has been diverted to Kuwait. It is not expected, however,
to be ready for operations until lateApril.  The 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division
has deployed from Kuwait to positions within Iraq.  Some airborne elements ( 173rd
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Airborne Brigade) have moved into positions in northern Iraq, and the 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment has started deployment. In addition to U.S. deployments, British
forces include an armor Battle Group, a naval Task Force (including Royal Marines),
and Royal Air Force units, totaling reportedly about 47,000 personnel.17  Australia
has deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations forces
operating in western Iraq.  Poland has approximately 200 special operations troops
augmenting British forces in  the Basra region.  DOD has announced that, as of April
2, 2003, more than 218,000 National Guard and Reservists from all services are now
called to active duty. 18  DOD has not indicated which of these personnel are being
deployed to the Persian Gulf region and how many will be “backfilling” positions of
active duty personnel in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. 
The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf states
of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  Though
there had been speculation about what level of cooperation/participation could  be
expected from these nations if the United Nations Security Council did not pass
another resolution specifically authorizing the use of force against Iraq, it currently
appears that they will continue to support U.S. military operations against Iraq.
Because  of significant popular opposition to this support in some countries,
governments have sought to minimize public acknowledgment of their backing.  U.S.
and Australian forces, both ground and air, have also deployed from Jordan and are
mounting special operations  against Iraq from the west.19
Outside the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark,
and Poland have offered combat force contributions.  Germany, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, and Ukraine have military nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) defense
teams in Kuwait, but these will not enter Iraq. After protracted debate, NATO’s
Defense Policy Committee approved Turkey’s request for military assistance and
directed NATO headquarters to begin the deployment of airborne early-warning
aircraft, air defense missiles, and chemical-biological defensive equipment. Both the
Netherlands and Germany have deployed Patriot air defense missiles to Turkey. 
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Diplomatic Issues
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661
(Last updated April 14, 2003)
The March 17, 2003 announcement by the United States, Britain, and Spain that
they were withdrawing their proposed “second resolution” at the United Nations
Security Council (see above, Background), was followed that evening by President
Bush’s nationwide address giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to flee or risk
military conflict.  These events marked the end of a major U.S. diplomatic effort to
win the support of a Security Council majority for action against Iraq.  
Relations with European Allies.  The end of the diplomatic phase of the
confrontation left a bitter aftermath among many U.S. officials and the European
opponents of the U.S. and British intervention.  After the war was launched on March
19, Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin charged that “This military action cannot
be justified in any way.”20  German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said “A bad
decision was taken: the choice of the logic of war has won over the chances for
peace.”21  French President Jacques Chirac, as expected, was also highly critical.  As
the war went forward, however, European rhetoric moderated as leaders sought to
avoid deepening the rift with the United States. Chancellor Schroeder and French
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin both said that they were hoping for a U.S.
victory and the early installation of a democratic regime in Iraq, while President Putin
affirmed that Russia wanted to continue to work with the United States to resolve
world problems.22  U.S. leaders also took steps to ease tensions with the Europeans.
President Bush telephoned Putin on April 5, and the two leaders agreed on continued
dialog with respect to Iraq.23  Earlier, Secretary of State Powell attended a meeting
of European foreign ministers in Brussels, where the atmosphere was described as
“relatively harmonious.”24  
Role of the United Nations.  The wounds of the Iraq debate remain
nonetheless, and further diplomatic complications seem possible, particularly with
respect to the United Nations role in post-war Iraq.  These complications could
extend even to U.S.-British relations, since Prime Minister Blair is a leading advocate
of a major U.N. role, whereas U.S. officials seem to favor confining the U.N. to
humanitarian relief operations.  The British government reportedly favors the
appointment of a U.N. special coordinator for Iraq, who would oversee the creation
of an interim authority consisting of Iraqis, the drafting of a new constitution, and an
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eventual handover to an Iraqi government.25  However, statements by U.S. officials,
including Secretary Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz indicate that they foresee the United States
orchestrating these events.26  President Bush and Prime Minister Blair discussed the
issue during their summit on Belfast on April 7-8, and the President affirmed that the
United Nations had a “vital role” to play in post-war Iraq.  Wolfowitz, however,
testified on April 10, that the U.N. “can’t be the managing partner.  It can’t be in
charge.”27
The European critics of the U.S. and British intervention, by contrast, advocate
a “central role” for the United Nations.   On April 11, 2003, after a meeting in St.
Petersburg, Schroeder, Putin, and Chirac affirmed that they were glad the Saddam
dictatorship had been overthrown, but insisted that Iraq should be rebuilt through a
broad-based effort under U.N. control.28  for the United Nations in administering Iraq
and in overseeing a transition to a democratic regime.29  Many in Europe see a U.N.
administration as essential to assuring that their governments and the European
private sector have a role to play in the recovery and reconstruction of Iraq.  A similar
debate could also occur over the extension of the Oil-for Food Program, which under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1472 remains under U.N. administration until May
12, 2003.  France, Russia, and Germany want this arrangement to continue, but some
in the Bush Administration favor U.S. management of Iraq’s oil exports.30  (For more
information, see below, Post-war Governance Issues and Humanitarian Issues.)
Debate on Improving Relations.  How heavily the United States should
invest in achieving compromise with European allies on these and other issues is an
issue in debate.  Some see little value in mending relations with European critics of
the war on grounds that the capabilities of their countries for contributing to global
threat reduction are limited.31  In this view, Atlantic cooperation and multilateral
approaches to world problems may have played a useful role during the Cold War,
but today may restrict the ability of the United States to respond to the threats it
faces.  There is concern that President Chirac in particular may see it as the role of
France and the European Union (EU) to “balance” and constrain U.S. power, so that
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any U.S. move to compromise with European critics could play into this objective
and damage U.S. interests.32  The counter-view is that the controversy over Iraq has
placed great strains on the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union –
international institutions that many see as important components of global stability
in the years ahead.  From this perspective, healing relations with European critics of
the United States can reduce tensions within these organizations and help them to
recover.33  Moreover, some maintain that the United States will have an easier time
of achieving its objectives in world affairs generally if it is regarded as a friendly and
cooperative country by Europeans and others.  Specifically, some  note that a major
EU financial contribution to the recovery of Iraq or to the resolution of other world
problems is more likely if U.S. relations with Germany and France improve.  These
two countries are central EU financial backers.  Those who favor greater
understanding of European positions point out that many European countries have
significant Muslim populations and see developments in the nearby Middle East as
directly affecting their security interests.
Use of Diplomatic Instruments in Support of the War.  With the onset
of war, the United States asked countries having diplomatic relations with Iraq to
close Iraqi embassies, freeze their assets, and expel Iraqi diplomats.  U.S. officials
argued that the regime in Iraq would soon change and that the new government
would be appointing new ambassadors.  Press reports suggest that the U.S. request
met with a mixed response.  Australia did expel Iraqi diplomats and close the
embassy, while a number of other countries expelled individual diplomats suspected
of espionage and left embassies open.  Some countries explicitly refused the U.S.
request.34  On March 20, 2003, President Bush issued an executive order confiscating
Iraqi assets, frozen since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for use for humanitarian
purposes.  The United States asked other countries holding Iraqi assets to do the
same, but this request too seems to have met with a mixed response to date.35
U.S. policymakers are concerned that Turkey might send a large number of
troops into northern Iraq, but have been successful in using diplomatic means to
prevent this from happening.  Turkey fears that any drive by Iraqi Kurds toward
independence would encourage Kurdish separatists in Turkey, but fighting between
Turks and Kurds in northern Iraq would greatly complicate U.S. efforts to stabilize
the country.  Turks also worry that Turkmen in northern Iraq, regarded as ethnic kin,
will be persecuted by Kurds.  President Bush warned Turkey not to come into
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northern Iraq on March 24.36  Secretary of State Powell visited Turkey on April 2,
2003, and an agreement was reached permitting Turkey to send a small monitoring
team into northern Iraq to assure that conditions did not develop that might compel
Turkey to intervene.  Turkey also agreed that nonlethal supplies for U.S. troops in
Iraq would be permitted to transit Turkey.37  To date, Turkey seems to be accepting
assurances that Kurdish guerrillas who have entered the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul
will not remain  and are already withdrawing. 
Finally, U.S. officials are applying firm diplomatic pressure to end any foreign
support for the Iraqi war effort.  The U.S. government has delivered a protest to the
government of Russia for failing to prevent Russian firms from selling military
equipment to Iraq in violation of United Nations sanctions.  The sales reportedly
included electronic jamming equipment and night vision goggles.  On March 28,
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accused the Syrian government of “hostile acts”for the
delivery of military goods, including night vision goggles, across the Syrian border
to Iraq, and said that the passage of armed Iraqi opposition elements from Iran into
Iraq was a threat to U.S. forces.  These opposition forces, known as the Badr Brigade,
oppose Saddam Hussein, but U.S. officials fear they could sow disunity in post-war
Iraq.   The warnings against Syria intensified on April 13, when President Bush
accused Syria of harboring leaders of the Saddam regime and of  possessing chemical
weapons, while Defense Secretary Rumsfeld charged that Syria was allowing
busloads of mercenaries to cross into Iraq to attack American troops.38  On April 14,
Secretary Powell threatened diplomatic, economic, or other economic sanctions
against Syria.
Use of Diplomatic Means to Promote Iraq’s Recovery.  Secretary of the
Treasury John Snow is heading an effort to persuade the international financial
community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to
support the rebuilding of Iraq.   On April 12, Snow reported that representatives of
the G-7 industrialized nations had reached a preliminary agreement on multilateral
effort to help Iraq after a meeting in Washington – if the U.N. Security Council
grants authorization.  Efforts to persuade governments to forgive debt owed by Iraq
are facing difficulties, however.  Russia, which is owed a reported $8 billion by Iraq
and is heavily in debt itself, seems particularly resistant.39
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Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated April 15, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-
range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, were the justifications
put forward for forcibly disarming Iraq.  However, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) have neither been used by Iraqi forces yet nor found by U.S. forces.  General
Amir Saadi, who oversaw UN inspections and who gave himself up on April 13,
reiterated his position that Iraq did not possess WMD, but few observers find his
assertions credible.  Although some observers believe it critical for the United States
to find evidence of WMD to justify invading Iraq, others believe that public opinion
at home and abroad would not be swayed by failure to find WMD.40  Many analysts
believe however, that international verification will be necessary to validate any
WMD-related discoveries.41
Iraq’s Deployable Weapons of Mass Destruction?. U.S. intelligence
reports suggested that Hussein had chemical and biological weapons dispersed,
armed and ready to be fired, with established  command and control.42 Some
observers suggested that U.S. forces toppled Iraq’s military command structure and
with it, the authorization to use such weapons.  Others suggested that Iraq had few
incentives to use such weapons, for several reasons: they would have limited military
utility against U.S. forces, which moved fast; Iraq had few delivery options, given
U.S. and allied command of the air; and the use of such weapons could have turned
world opinion against Iraq.43  Many believed the threat of WMD use would increase
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the closer U.S. forces got to Baghdad, and then decrease once they were in the city
(presumably because of collateral effects).
Targeting WMD and WMD Sites.  As of April 15, no WMD or WMD-
related sites have been found by U.S. forces.  On April 7, there were two reports of
potential discoveries of Iraqi chemical weapons.  Knight-Ridder reported that U.S.
forces at an Iraqi military compound at Albu Muhawish came down with symptoms
of nerve agent exposure on April 5.  Although two tests showed the presence of nerve
agents, later  tests indicated the chemicals were likely pesticides.  A  report from
NPR that medium-range missiles potentially containing sarin and mustard gas were
found has not been verified by the Pentagon or CENTCOM.  Many defense officials,
including Secretary Rumsfeld, have stressed the fact that many initial reports do not
prove to be correct.
The Army’s 75th Intelligence Exploitation Task Force is leading teams of
weapons experts to hunt on the ground for WMD.  These teams include former
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspectors and U.S. civilian and military personnel.
According to one report, the teams will be focusing on 36 priority sites of a potential
1000 sites.44  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has been negotiating
contracts with private companies, including Halliburton, to destroy WMD stocks that
are found.  This approach contrasts sharply with the 1991 Gulf War experience.  In
that war, first U.S. airstrikes and then ground forces destroyed significant portions
of Iraq’s WMD and WMD capabilities.  Air strikes were able to target well-known
chemical weapon and missile capabilities, in contrast to lesser known biological or
nuclear capabilities.45
Corralling WMD capabilities before destroying them could help limit
environmental and health consequences associated with destruction, as well as
opportunities for terrorist acquisition.  Iinadvertent destruction of WMD will likely
be a continuing concern.  During the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. and coalition forces
destroyed warehouses that contained chemical warheads, including at the Khamisiyah
site, and a DoD investigation concluded that as many as 100,000 U.S. personnel
could have been affected by environmental releases.46  According to one report, the
United States’ nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) units “have made major
advancements since the Persian Gulf War of 1991,” when Czech NBC units detected
sarin and mustard gas, but American detection units could not verify the results.47
The impact of potential inadvertent destruction would depend on what kind of WMD
is present (e.g., biological weapons pose fewer problems in destruction than chemical
weapons, because dispersal is less likely and they do not require such high
temperatures for destruction); how the material or weapons are stored; and
geographic, geological, and temporal circumstances.  
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U.S. warplanners’ approach of encircling and guarding key WMD sites rather
than destroying them could also help prevent the transfer of capabilities to those
seeking WMD capabilities.  Although there is no evidence in the past or the present
for Iraq sharing its WMD technologies, capabilities, or materials with terrorists, there
is also no guarantee that this could not happen. 
Role for U.N. Inspectors?  From November 2002 to March 2003,
UNMOVIC and the IAEA conducted approximately 750 inspections at 550 sites.
Those inspections uncovered relatively little: empty chemical weapons shells not
previously declared; two R-400 aerial bombs at a site where Iraq unilaterally
destroyed BW-filled aerial bombs; 2,000 pages of undeclared documents on uranium
enrichment; undeclared remotely piloted vehicles; and cluster bombs that could be
used with chemical or biological agents.  As a result of the inspections, however, Iraq
destroyed 70 (of a potential 100-120) Al-Samoud-2 missiles.  On the eve of war,
about 200 U.N. staff left Iraq.  UNMOVIC’s Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix
expressed disappointment at the unfinished job of the inspectors.  The U.N. has not
been asked to help verify whatever WMD U.S. forces might uncover.
Reportedly, the White House is considering international verification of what
it finds in Iraq, but this may not include UN inspectors.   Blix, who has stated he will
leave in June 2003 at the end of his contract, said UNMOVIC would not accept
“being led, as a dog” to sites that allied forces choose to display.48   UN officials hope
to revive a role for UN inspectors; U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, has stated
that inspectors will return after the war and Mexico, the current president of the
Security Council, has made a formal  proposal.  Reportedly, the UN Security Council
will meet with Blix on April 15.  At a minimum, the IAEA will conduct inspections
per Iraq’s nuclear safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
A post-Hussein Iraq might consent to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention, but there are no equivalent international inspection regimes for
biological weapons or missiles at present.49  Some have suggested that the United
States, if it took possession of Iraq’s chemical weapons, would be bound as a party
to the Chemical Weapons Convention, to allow international inspections of
destruction.50 The world community’s confidence in Iraq’s disarmament, and hence,
the necessity for an ongoing monitoring regime, may depend on the level of
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Post-War Governance Issues
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated April 14, 2003)
The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation and instability in a post-Saddam
Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations have been present in the Administration
debates over post-war policy in Iraq.  One of the concerns cited by the George H.W.
Bush Administration for ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that
a post-Saddam Iraq could dissolve into chaos.  It was feared that the ruling Sunni
Muslims, the majority but under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would fight each
other, and open Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.    Because
of the complexities of various post-war risks to stability in Iraq and the region, some
observers believe that post-war Iraq might most effectively be governed by a military
or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to full democracy but would
comply with applicable U.N. resolutions.  To date,  no such figure has stepped
forward to offer to play a leadership role.  
Administration Policy on Governance.  The Administration insists that
it will do what is necessary to bring about a stable, democratic successor regime that
complies with all applicable U.N. resolutions.   In press interviews on April 6, 2003,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz indicated that the  Administration is
hoping to turn post-war governance over to an Iraqi interim administration within six
months.  Experts note that all projections, including the duration of the U.S. military
occupation and the numbers of occupation troops, could be determined by the amount
of Iraqi resistance and U.S. casualties.  The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric
Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 24,  that as many
as 200,000 U.S. troops might be needed for a postwar occupation, although other
Administration officials, including Wolfowitz, have disputed the Shinseki
assessment.
Under plans formulated before hostilities began, U.S. officials said that Lt. Gen.
Jay Garner (ret.) is directing U.S. civilian occupation forces, which are to include
U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government personnel serving as advisers and
administrators in Iraq’s various ministries.  He heads the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance, within the Department of Defense, created by a
January 20, 2003 executive order.  He and most of his staff of about 200 have
deployed to Umm Qasr, just inside Iraq, to begin work.  During the interim period,
the United States goals are to eliminate remaining WMD and terrorist cells in Iraq,
begin economic reconstruction, and purge Baath Party leaders.  Iraq’s oil industry is
to be rebuilt and upgraded.  
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The exact nature of post-war governance might depend on the outcome of
discussions between the United States and its European allies over a U.N. role in
post-war Iraq, which was also the focus of President Bush’s meeting in Belfast with
British Prime Minister Blair on April 7 and 8.  Britain and most European countries
believe that the Iraqi people would more easily accommodate to a U.N.- administered
post-war Iraq.   Senior U.S. officials, with the reported exception of Secretary of
State Powell, want to keep the U.N. role limited to humanitarian relief and economic
reconstruction, reserving most decisions about a post-war Iraqi power structure to the
United States and Britain.   U.S. officials say they would support a new U.N. Security
Council resolution that would endorse a new government, and, with U.S. support,
Secretary-General Annan said on April 7 that he was appointing a U.N. coordinator,
Pakistani diplomat Rafeuddin Ahmedm,  to run U.N. operations in Iraq.  However,
U.S. officials note that some of the countries that opposed the war might object to
adopting a resolution that they believe might legitimize a U.S.-British occupation.
(For further discussion, see above, Diplomatic Issues.) 
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a direct role for U.S. officials in running a post-
war Iraqi government.  The opposition groups that have been active over the past few
years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they are able to and entitled
to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might yield substantial
power to those associated with the Baathist regime.   The exiled opposition met in
northern Iraq in late February 2003 to plan their involvement in a post-Saddam
regime.  At that meeting, against U.S. urging, the opposition named a six-man
council that is to prepare for a transition government: Iraqi National Congress
director Ahmad Chalabi; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani;
Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani; Shiite Muslim leader Mohammad
Baqr Al Hakim, who heads the Iran-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); Iraq National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi
foreign minister Adnan Pachachi.   
Establishing an Interim Administration.  The Bush Administration asserts
that it wants Iraqis who stayed in Iraq and were not part of the exiled opposition to
participate in an interim government, and that it will not play a role in choosing who
leads Iraq next.  However, the U.S. military airlifted about 700 opposition fighters
(Free Iraqi Forces), led by Chalabi, into the Nasiriyah area on April 6, appearing to
give him and the exiled opposition an endorsement for key roles in an interim
government.  Press reports on April 14 suggest that Chalabi and the Free Iraqi Forces
might soon be deployed to Baghdad to help U.S. forces restore civil order now that
the regime has fallen.  The Administration says that on April 15 it will hold, in
Nasiriyah, the first of a series of local meetings to begin organizing an interim
administration.  Some key exile groups, including SCIRI, have said they will not
attend the meeting, indicating that some groups do not want to appear to be
associated with a U.S.-led selection process.  At the same time, some recent violence
in the Shiite-dominated areas of Iraq, including the early April killing of prominent
cleric Abd al-Majid Khoi, could be connected with a jockeying for power within the
Shiite community, and between it and other contenders.       
Reconstruction and Oil Industry Issues.   It is widely assumed that Iraq’s
vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to
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fund reconstruction.  Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 18,
2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a variety of means ... to shoulder
much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.”  Many observers have been
concerned that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields.
Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire before withdrawing from there in 1991, but coalition
forces say they have secured Iraq’s southern oil fields since combat began on March
19, 2003.  Only about 9 oil wells were set on fire, of a total of over 500 oil fields in
that region, and virtually all have now been put out.  No fires were set in the northern
oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul, now under control of U.S.-led forces.   British forces
are attempting to get Iraqi oil workers in southern Iraq to return to work in Iraq’s oil
industry, and some press reports say U.S. officials expect that at least some oil
exports could resume in a few weeks.   Press reports on April 14, 2003 said the
United States is considering former senior Iraqi oil professional Fadhil Othman to be
an interim oil minister, reportedly with some oversight by a U.S. oil administrative
official.
A related  issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves.  Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.  Some press reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such
control,51 although some observers speculate that the Administration had initially
sought to create such an impression in order to persuade Russia to support use of
force against Iraq. 
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program.  Before the war, about 60%
of Iraqis received all their foodstuffs from the U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food
Program.  The program, which is an exception to the comprehensive U.N. embargo
on Iraq put in place after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, began operations in December
1996.   It was suspended just before hostilities began, when U.N. staff in Iraq that run
the various aspects of the program departed Iraq.  As of March 14, 2003, about $9
billion worth of humanitarian goods were in the process of being delivered or in
production.   On March 28, 2003, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1472 that restarts the program’s operations and empowers the United
Nations, for a 45-day period, to take direct control of all aspects of  the program.
Under the new resolution, the United Nations is setting priorities for and directing the
delivery of already contracted supplies.  The Bush Administration envisions that a
post-war Iraqi interim administration will reassume those functions from U.N. staff
when an interim administration is in place and able to perform these duties.
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In November 2002, the U.S. government reportedly contacted the governments
of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq.  On March 18,
2003, the Administration released a list of 30 countries that have publicly stated their
support for U.S. efforts to disarm Iraq, and Secretary of State Powell said that 15
other countries were giving private backing; according to the White House, the
number of countries publicly providing a range of types of support has since grown
to 49.  Nevertheless, only three countries supplied ground combat troops in
significant numbers– in contrast to the 1991 Gulf war when more than 30 countries
provided military support or to the 2002 campaign in Afghanistan, when 21 sent
armed forces.52
Political and Military Factors.  On the international political front, analysts
contend that it was important for the United States to enlist allies in order to
demonstrate that it was not acting unilaterally–that its use of force to disarm Iraq had
been endorsed by a broad global coalition.  Although the political leaders of some
Islamic countries were reportedly sympathetic to the Bush Administration’s aims,
they had to consider hostility to U.S. actions among their populations.  Analysts have
suggested that some countries sided with the United States out of mixed motives;
former U.S. ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter characterized the nations backing
U.S. policy as “a coalition of the convinced, the concerned, and the co-opted.”53
Some western governments that provided support asked that the Bush Administration
remove their names from the coalition list.54  
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation was not critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the
United States initially relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only
small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries.  Allied combat
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and peacekeeping forces arrived in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been
defeated.  Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because
the unique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating
and then calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the
utmost speed in command and communications.55
An opposing view is that the United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan
to lay the political groundwork for an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism.
However, during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-
makers complained that the requirement for allied consensus hampered the military
campaign with a time-consuming bombing target approval process.  Another military
rationale for having primarily U.S. forces conduct operations against Iraq was that
few other countries possess the military capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air lift,
precision guided munitions, and night vision equipment) necessary for a high-tech
campaign designed to achieve victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S.
casualties.
Direct and Indirect Contributions.  Britain, the only other country that had
warplanes patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq, sent or committed 45,000 ground
troops, as well as air and naval forces, and Australia committed 2,000 special forces
troops, naval vessels, and fighter aircraft.  Poland authorized 200 troops, including
both special forces and non-combat personnel.  In a non-combat capacity, Denmark
sent two warships and a medical unit, South Korea approved the deployment of 700
engineers and medics, and Spain has dispatched three naval vessels.  Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine pledged contingents of
anti-chemical and -biological weapons specialists.56  Romania dispatched non-
combat troops (engineers, medics, and military police), and about 1,000 U.S.
personnel have been stationed in ConstanÛa, which is acting as an “air bridge” to the
Persian Gulf.  Japan, constitutionally barred from sending ground troops, reportedly
may also help in the disposal of chemical and biological weapons, and reinforced its
naval fleet patrolling the Indian Ocean.57
Other forms of support were also valuable.  For example, countries granted
overflight rights or back-filled for U.S. forces that might redeploy to Iraq from
Central Asia or the Balkans:  Canada is sending nearly 3,000 troops to Afghanistan,
freeing up U.S. soldiers for Iraq.  In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes
from countries close to Iraq reduced the need for mid-air refueling, allowed aircraft
to re-arm sooner, and  enabled planes to respond more quickly to ground force calls
for air strikes; several countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Spain, Italy,
Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria are allowing the use of their airbases and seaports.
At the Bush Administration’s request, Hungary approved the use of its Taszar airbase
for the training of Iraqi dissidents as non-combatant interpreters and administrators;
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the initial plan was to train up to 3,000 Iraqi expatriates, but on April 1 it was
announced that the program had been suspended after 100-150 had been trained.58 
On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of
assistance from the NATO allies, such as AWACS, refueling, and overflight
privileges; the request was deferred.  On February 10, France, Germany and Belgium
vetoed U.S. and Turkish requests to bolster Turkish defenses on the grounds that
assent would implicitly endorse an attack on Iraq; German Chancellor Schroeder
sought to sharpen the distinction by announcing that his government would provide
defensive missiles and AWACS crews to help protect Turkey on a bilateral basis.
The impasse was broken by an agreement over language indicating that such
assistance “relates only to the defense of Turkey” and would not imply NATO
support for a military operation against Iraq.59  Despite the compromise, many
observers believe the temporary rift may have lasting consequences for NATO.
The Bush Administration asked permission of the Turkish government to use
Turkish bases and ports and to move American troops through southeast Turkey to
establish a northern front against Iraq.  The talks over troop access proceeded in
tandem with negotiations over a U.S. aid package.60  An initial agreement was struck,
permitting 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey; in return, the United States would provide
$6 billion in assistance.  On March 1, however, the  Turkish parliament rejected the
deal by a 3-vote margin.  Prime Minister Erdogan urged Washington to wait, but by
March 18, the U.S. military cargo vessels that had been standing anchored off the
Turkish coast were sent steaming to the Gulf.  On March 20, the Turkish parliament
authorized overflight rights but also agreed to send Turkish troops into Iraq, a move
opposed by the United States and other countries.  After an early April visit by
Secretary Powell, it was announced that Turkey would permit the transshipment of
nonlethal military supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Iraq.  (See above,
Diplomatic Issues).  Some Members of Congress criticized Turkey, claiming it
sought to leverage U.S. strategic needs to squeeze aid out of Washington.  However,
Turkish officials argued that more than 90% of their country’s population opposed
war and that Turkey suffered severe economic losses from the 1991 Gulf War.
Ankara also was concerned that the Iraq conflict might re-kindle efforts of Kurdish
separatists to carve out a Kurdish state; such a move would likely prompt Turkish
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intervention.  Finally, Turkey has sought assurances that Iraq’s 2-3 million ethnic
Turkmen would be able to play a post-war role in Iraq.61
In late February 2003, Jordan’s prime minister acknowledged the presence of
several hundred U.S. military personnel on Jordanian soil; the troops were reportedly
there to operate Patriot missile defense systems and to conduct search-and-rescue
missions; the deployment marked a reversal from Jordan’s neutral stance during the
1991 Gulf war.62  Egypt is permitting the U.S. military to use its airspace and the
Suez Canal.  Although the Persian Gulf states generally opposed an attack on Iraq in
public statements, more than 225,000 U.S. military personnel are ashore or afloat in
the region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers;
according to recent reports, the Saudi government sanctioned limited use of the
Prince Sultan airbase command center and permitted search-and-rescue operations
to be conducted along the Saudi-Iraqi border.  The Saudis also pledged to step up
their oil output to compensate for any drop in Iraqi production.  Kuwait served as the
launch pad for the U.S.-led ground attack against Iraq.  In addition, five U.S. aircraft
carriers were in the region.
Post-Conflict Assistance.  After the 1991 Gulf War, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq.  However, U.S. policymakers hope that many countries will
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
peacekeeping forces.  Before hostilities, several countries, including France, Japan,
Sweden, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania indicated that they might play a
role.  In late April, it was announced that U.S. diplomats had approached 65
governments requesting assistance in reconstruction efforts, and that 58 countries had
responded favorably.  Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz stated that the Bush
Administration would “pressure all our friends and allies to contribute as much as
they can.”63  Various types of commitments already are being announced; for
example, the Japanese and Canadian governments have pledged $100 million and
$65 million in assistance, respectively, and Rome has said that it would dispatch up
to 3,000 troops to help in humanitarian activities.
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The current U.S.-led military campaign to disarm Iraq and end the regime of
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could have widespread effects on the broader Middle
East. The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq is likely
to increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments may feel even
more constrained in accommodating future U.S. policy goals.  Middle East
governments providing support to the U.S. effort against Iraq have done so with
minimal publicity and will expect to be rewarded with financial assistance, political
support, or both, in the war’s aftermath.
Allegations by senior U.S. officials including President Bush that Syria
facilitated the movement of military equipment into Iraq and offered safe haven to
Iraqi leaders have fed speculation that Syria and possibly other Middle East countries
may follow Iraq as future targets of U.S. military action.  Such warnings could
encourage more cooperation on the part of other Middle Eastern countries with U.S.
policy goals in an effort to forestall possible U.S. reprisals against them.  On the
other hand, the U.S. warnings could have the opposite effect by inducing resentment
within the region over what many may regard as unwarranted U.S. interference in
Middle East affairs.
 
Democracy and Governance.  Some commentators, including officials in
the Bush Administration, believe that the war with Iraq, if it culminates in the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, will lead to a democratic revolution in large parts of
the Middle East. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort to
pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in
economic and social spheres, as well as in individual freedom and political
empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
In his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17, 2003, President Bush commented
that after Saddam departs from the scene, the Iraqi people “can set an example to all
the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.”
Skeptics, however, charge that U.S. Middle Eastern policy has traditionally been
tolerant of autocratic or corrupt regimes as long as they provide support for U.S.
strategic or economic objectives in the region. Other critics argue that the minimal
amount of assistance contained in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first
year) reflects only a token effort to support democratization and development,
although the Administration is requesting significantly more funding for this
initiative–$145 million–in FY2004. Still others fear that more open political systems
could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups, who often constitute the
most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other groups whose goals
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might be inimical to U.S. interests. Some commentators are concerned that lack of
prior experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic institutions
in the Middle East.  Finally, a U.S.-installed government in Iraq may find it difficult
to gain acceptance within the Arab world.64
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. Administration officials and other commentators
argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more favorable climate
for future initiatives to resume currently stalled Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.
Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush Administration, which
brought Arabs and Israelis together in a landmark peace conference at Madrid in
1991, after first disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Officials of the present
Bush Administration continue to speak of their vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli
peace settlement after eliminating current threats from Iraq. In a statement to the
press on March 14, 2003, President Bush affirmed that “America is committed, and
I am personally committed, to implementing our road map toward peace” between
Arabs and Israelis.  
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to U.S. interests than Iraq.
They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led coalition against Iraq
is far weaker than it was in 1991, and argue that cooperation from Arab and Muslim
states will remain limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli issues continue to
fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate in Arab-Israeli
negotiations, combined with the war against Iraq, runs the risk of inflaming popular
opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in anti-U.S. terrorism.
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region.  Large-scale deployment of
U.S. troops to the Middle East to wage war against Iraq and the likelihood of a
continued major U.S. military presence in the region will exert added pressures on
Middle East governments to accommodate U.S. policies in the near term. However,
some fear that long-lasting major U.S. military commitments in the region, could
heighten resentment against the United States from Islamic fundamentalists,
nationalists, and other groups opposed to a U.S. role in the Middle East; such
resentment could manifest itself in sporadic long-term terrorism directed against U.S.
interests in the region. Even friendly Middle East countries may eventually seek a
reduction in U.S. military presence.  According to a Washington Post report on
February 9, 2003, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah plans to request the
withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Saudi territory after Iraq has been disarmed.
U.S. and Saudi officials declined to comment on this report, which an unnamed
White House official described as “hypothetical.”  Periodic dissension within the
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Arab world could also affect future security arrangements in the Middle East,
particularly any arrangements involving the United States.65
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Humanitarian Assistance.66
U.S. Assistance.  Large-scale humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
programs are expected to be undertaken by the United States during and following
the war with Iraq.  So far, initial U.S. assistance expenditures have been aimed at
preparations for the delivery of humanitarian aid, including 610,000 tons of food.
However, with the main fighting now finished in Iraq, attention is also quickly
turning to plans for reconstruction.
Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP). The OFFP was suspended between March
18 and March 28, 2003.  Prior to its suspension, approximately $10 billion worth of
humanitarian supplies were in the process of being delivered or produced, of which
one quarter covered food needs.  On March 28, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously approved Resolution 1472, which gives Secretary General Annan
authority to prioritize and coordinate the immediate humanitarian needs of Iraqi
civilians for an initial 45-day period under an expanded OFFP.  The resolution
authorizes the transfer of responsibility for the distribution of food and medicine in
central and southern Iraq from the Iraqi government to the U.N. Secretary-General.
Iraq rejected the resolution on March 29.  The OFFP is dependent upon Iraq’s future
cooperation with the OFFP (and use of its distribution network) and the security of
the personnel working for the United Nations once inside Iraq.67  Furthermore, a
number of agencies have indicated they plan to use the OFFP system, but how the
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provision of aid is to be coordinated among multiple donors remains to be worked
out.  A broader discussion taking place between the United States and members of
the international community is the role of the United Nations in a post-conflict Iraq,
how the process will be shaped, and who will have primary responsibility for the
relief and reconstruction effort.  (See above, Diplomatic Issues.)
Other Donors.  On March 28, U.N. agencies issued a $2.2 billion "flash
appeal" for humanitarian aid to Iraq to cover expenditures for a  six-month period.
Of that total, $1.3 billion would be for food aid.  As of April 5, $1.2 billion in
pledges had been received.  International contributions have been pledged or received
from a number of other donors in funds for Iraq to ease the humanitarian burden in
neighboring countries and for in-kind emergency supplies. Donor contributions with
respect to reconstruction and long-term aid remain unclear. 
U.S. Aid Policy Structure in Iraq.
To prepare for the use of aid, a post-war planning office was established on
January 20, 2003, by a presidential directive.  The Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), although located in the Defense Department, is
staffed by officials from agencies throughout the government.  While immediate
overall responsibility for the war and management of U.S. activity in post-war Iraq
belongs to General Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Central Command, the
ORHA is charged with producing plans for his use in carrying out that role.  In
addition, it is responsible for implementing U.S. assistance efforts in Iraq.  The
Office, headed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, has three civilian
coordinators:  for reconstruction, civil administration, and humanitarian relief.68
While most of the staff awaits deployment from Kuwait, 62 staff members are now
in Iraq to begin assessing needs and coordinating assistance.
According to planners, U.S. armed forces will take the lead in relief and
reconstruction, later turning to existing Iraqi ministries, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and international organizations to assume some of the
burden.69  The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has put together
Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) which will eventually be deployed
around the country.  Reportedly, some U.S. humanitarian groups are objecting to the
U.S. military taking charge of all relief efforts.  They are concerned that operating
under DOD jurisdiction complicates their ability to help the Iraqis, jeopardizes their
neutrality, and increases the risk to aid workers because they will be perceived as
being closely allied with the U.S. campaign. 
Humanitarian Assistance: Relief Operations.
Background.  Until it was suspended on the eve of war, U.N. and other
humanitarian agencies were providing aid to Iraq through the OFFP, which used
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revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and medicines for the civilian population.70
Sixty percent of Iraq’s estimated population of 24 to 27 million were receiving
monthly food distributions under the OFFP.  Sources say that families were not able
to make their rations last the full month or they need to sell part of them for other
necessities – leaving many people with little food stored in reserve and more
vulnerable.  Others say that the average Iraqi has food supplies lasting a few months.
Food security remains uncertain, just as the amount of food stored in OFFP
warehouses is also unclear.  Some argue that while food may not be an issue at the
moment, supplies need to be entering the country now in order to prevent a crisis in
a few weeks.
Contingency Preparations.  In the weeks leading up to the war, aid
organizations planned for humanitarian needs amid great uncertainty about
conditions in the aftermath of conflict.  They report that emergency supplies such as
water, food, medicine, shelter materials, and hygiene kits are in place in countries
bordering Iraq.  While some argue that there is still a huge shortfall of resources and
funding available for humanitarian assistance, the borders remaining quiet allowed
more time for further preparation.  There were concerns about the absorptive capacity
of neighboring countries, whether they could provide adequately for these
populations, and the impact of refugee flows on stability in the region.  Iran, Turkey,
Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait all publicly stated that they would prevent
refugees from entering their countries, although each continues to make preparations
for assistance either within Iraq’s borders or at transit areas at border crossing points.
The U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Ramiro Lopez da Silva, has set up an
interim logistics hub in Cyprus. Although NGOs have also been putting together
plans, the absence of international organizations and NGOs with experience
operating in and around Iraq means there are few networks in place and some
concern over the implementation of relief operations. 
Current  Operating  Environment.  The war is disrupting critical
infrastructure, delivery of basic services, and food distribution and impacting the
humanitarian situation inside Iraq.  The amount of assistance that is ultimately
needed will obviously depend on the nature and duration of the conflict.  It is
anticipated that problems could arise from malnutrition and disruption of food
supplies, inadequate sanitation and clean water, and reduced health and medical care.
The United Nations reportedly expects that nearly 40% of the Iraqi population could
require food assistance within weeks.71  In parts of Iraq supplies of water, food,
medicine, and electricity are already a matter of urgent concern.72  Some
humanitarian aid has been delivered to Iraq since the opening days of the war, but
ongoing fighting has not allowed consistent, comprehensive delivery.  
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In the short term, security of humanitarian aid delivery and distribution is
becoming a matter of concern.  During the height of the military campaign, when
small amounts of aid got through, logistical problems and unruly mobs made
distribution very difficult.  Now, widespread looting and lawlessness have increased
dramatically, particularly in places where heavy fighting has subsided.  It has even
spread to looting hospitals and water supply installations which is having an
increased impact on health care.  Aid agencies have not been able to get in due to the
security situation, and the chaos and violence is hampering their efforts to provide
vital assistance.  There are concerns about how long aid agencies posed Iraq’s border
will have to wait.  The UN  has appealed to coalition forces to act quickly to avoid
the complete breakdown of aid efforts, calling for them to protect essential
infrastructure such as hospitals and water supply systems and to enable a full-scale
effort to deliver food, water, and medical aid.  Some UN staff were reportedly
returning to certain parts of Iraq on April 14, security permitting. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been operating in
Iraq since the war began.  ICRC teams report that hospitals in Baghdad are
overwhelmed by casualties and in need of additional medical supplies and staff.  For
some, access to hospitals has been difficult or impossible because of military
operations.  It is impossible to obtain accurate statistics on casualties and treatment
provided.  An ICRC convoy was fired on in Baghdad on April 8 and one of its aid
workers was killed.  Corpses are piling up in some places.  This coupled with
summer heat and deteriorating water and electricity have some concerned about the
high risks of epidemic disease.  The WHO is making plans to conduct a full
assessment of hospital situations.
An insufficient water supply is proving to be one of the biggest humanitarian
challenges.  Deliveries by tanker to some towns and building an extension to the
pipeline from Kuwait to Umm Qasr are mechanisms underway to address the
problem.73  Lack of electricity is a problem for many Iraqis; shortages of fuel have
also been reported.  Emergency supplies have been provided to aid agencies assisting
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  In northern Iraq, the ICRC has continued to
monitor the condition of the IDPs and provided emergency and non-aid items to
displaced families.  High food prices  together with poor reserves are said to be a
growing problem.  For the moment, food supplies appear to be adequate.   The WFP
has started moving food from Turkey into northern Iraq and has made plans to open
another humanitarian corridor in Iran.  The WFP predicts that the food program in
Iraq will be the largest in history, providing four times the amount supplied to
Afghanistan after the Taliban was ousted.
 
Limited or no access by the United Nations and aid agencies makes it difficult
to confirm reports of population displacement. According to the United Nations,
there is a reported increase in the number of people leaving Baghdad for the
countryside and small towns.74  There have been some increased population
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movements within Iraq, which in recent weeks appeared to be occurring mainly in
the north. Apparently 90% of these IDPs have been able to find local accommodation
with friends and relatives.   Few refugees have been moving out of Iraq.  However,
for several weeks some people were gathering close to the Iraq/Iran border in the
south. Since the fall of Baghdad, up to 30,000 displaced Iraqis have reportedly
gathered at the Iraqi border near western Iran.  UNHCR is responding with assistance
and reports that these IDPs do not intend to cross into Iran.  Third Country Nationals
(TCNs) represented the main bulk of individuals leaving Iraq.  Asylum seekers have
been reported at several border areas, but there are no confirmed arrivals.
The now coalition-controlled port of Umm Qasr, Iraq’s main outlet to the
Persian Gulf, is a crucial gateway for humanitarian supplies.  British and Australian
forces continue to sweep it for mines, but massive dredging and rebuilding is
required to prepare the port for large cargo ships.  In the meantime, once the port is
operational, some sources fear that offloading will be slow and inefficient, leading
to risks of delay in the delivery and distribution of relief materials.  The Royal Fleet
Auxiliary ship Sir Galahad, containing humanitarian supplies, arrived at the port on
March 28.  The food will be stored in a warehouse until the OFFP can be revived.
Australian cargo ships carrying food aid have been delayed entry into the port
because of the need for further mine sweeping.  A team of port management
specialists and engineers are reported to be assessing the damage to the port and
determining what needs to be done to make it operational for the distribution of
humanitarian aid.
Relief and Security.  Throughout the country military operations and
logistical problems  continue to complicate the security of supply routes, and
although the situation on the ground remains precarious for aid agencies, reports
indicate that U.N. agencies are beginning to plan detailed operations there.  Once
security is firmly established, questions remain about delivery of aid (whether roads
used by the military will be usable or whether separate supply routes will need to be
put in place); availability of cargo and water trucks (currently in short supply); and
distribution (particularly in cities where the military may not have gained full control
over population centers.
Aid agencies plan to establish bases within Iraq to support relief operations as
soon as possible.  However, they fear that receiving protection from coalition-led
forces could mean an increase in security risks for their staff because they risk losing
neutrality.  The EU is also concerned about the “independence and integrity of
delivering humanitarian aid.”75  Continuing instability has prevented attempts to fully
assess the needs of local people and provide humanitarian assistance.  The apparent
bitterness towards the coalition forces also remains an issue.
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International and Domestic Legal Issues Relating to the Use
of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated April 14, 2003)
The use of United States military force against Iraq raised a number of domestic
and  international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article I, § 8, of the Constitution
and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under international law if seen as a
preemptive use of force; and (3) the effect of United Nations Security Council
resolutions on the matter.  The following subsections give brief overviews of these
issues and provide links to reports that discuss these matters in greater detail.
  
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.  Domestic legal
issues raised by the use of military force against Iraq concerned both the Constitution
and the War Powers Resolution.  Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on
Congress the power to “declare War”; and historically Congress has employed this
authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force.
Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of the government
in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States ....”  Because of these separate powers, and because of claims
about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue of the existence
of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often arisen about the
extent to which the President may use military force without congressional
authorization.  While all commentators agree that the President has the constitutional
authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without congressional
authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent to which, the use
of offensive force in a given situation, as in Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in
order to be constitutional. 
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.”  Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
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Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force. 
With respect to Iraq, these legal requirements were met.  As noted earlier in this
report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorized the President
“to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”  As predicates for the use of force, the
statute required the President to communicate to Congress his determination that the
use of diplomatic and other peaceful means would not “adequately protect the United
States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions” and that the use of force would be “consistent” with the battle against
terrorism.  On March 18, 2003, President Bush sent a letter to Congress making these
determinations.
P.L. 107-243 also specifically stated that it was “intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution.”  Thus, it waived the time limitations that would otherwise have been
applicable under the WPR.  The statute also required the President to make periodic
reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.”  P.L. 107-243
expressed congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt
and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions, but it did not condition the use of force on
prior Security Council authorization.  The authorization did not contain any time
limitation.
Subsequent to enactment of the authorization but prior to the initiation of
military action, twelve members of the House of Representatives, along with a
number of U.S. soldiers and the families of soldiers, filed suit against President Bush
seeking to enjoin  military action against Iraq on the grounds it would exceed the
authority granted by the October resolution or, alternatively, that the October
resolution unconstitutionally delegated Congress’ power to declare war to the
President.  On February 24, 2003, the trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds it
raised a nonjusticiable political question; and on March 13, 2003, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, albeit on different grounds.  The appellate
court stated that, although the mobilization of U.S. forces clearly imposed hardships
on the plaintiffs soldiers and family members, the situation was too fluid to determine
whether there was an irreconcilable conflict between the political branches on the
matter of using force; and, thus, the separation of powers issues raised by the suit
were not ripe for judicial review.  On the delegation issue, the appellate court ruled
that the Constitution allows Congress to confer substantial discretionary authority on
the President, particularly with respect to foreign affairs, and that in this instance
there was no “clear evidence of congressional abandonment of the authority to
declare war to the President.”  “[T]he appropriate recourse for those who oppose war
with Iraq,” the First Circuit concluded, “lies with the political branches.”  See Doe
v. Bush, 240 F.Supp.2d 95 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2003), aff’d, 322 F.3d 109 (1st Cir.
March 13, 2003), rehearing denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4830 (1st Cir. March 18,
2003).
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International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force.  Given that the
United States had not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question that arose with
respect to the use of force against Iraq concerned its legitimacy under international
law, if considered apart from Security Council resolutions.  International law
traditionally has recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that
right continues to be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  Self-defense has
also traditionally included the right to use force preemptively.  But to be recognized
as legitimate under international law, preemption has had to meet at least two tests:
(1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be imminent, and (2) the means used
have had to be  proportionate to the threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces.  But some contend that the advent of
terrorism, coupled with the potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has
altered that equation.  The Bush Administration, in particular, argued in a national
security strategy document released in 2002 that “we must adapt the concept of
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s ... rogue states and
terrorists” by expanding the parameters of preemptive self-defense to include war
against potential threats, i.e., preventive war.76  Subsequently, with respect to the
legality under international law of its use of force against Iraq, the Administration
relied primarily on prior resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.77  But
it also claimed that its use of force was justified on the basis of our “inherent right
of self defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter.”78
There is considerable doubt that Iraq posed a threat of attack on the U.S.
sufficiently imminent to fall within the traditional justification for preemption.
Arguably, therefore, the use of force against Iraq can be seen as an exercise not of the
traditional right of self-defense but of the Administration’s expanded doctrine of
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preemption that incorporates preventive war.  To the extent that is the case, critics
argue that the military action against Iraq has loosened the legal constraints the
international community has attempted to impose on the use of force since World
War II and presages similar justifications for the use of force against other states
deemed to be potential, but not imminent, threats.  India, in particular, it is noted, has
been drawing parallels between Iraq and Pakistani actions regarding Kashmir; and,
it is argued, other states may do so as well.  Thus, the use of force against Iraq has
provided a singular opportunity to examine whether the international legal standards
governing preemption have been violated and, if so, whether the traditional standards
ought to be reformulated.  
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Security Council Authorization.  Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right.  But the Charter was
intended to change this legal situation.  The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”  To that end it mandates
that its Member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....”  It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council.  While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its Member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans.  In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the “inherent right” of
States to use force in self-defense.
On March 17, 2003, the United States, Great Britain, and Spain abandoned
efforts in the Security Council to obtain a new explicit authorization for the use of
force against Iraq.  Nonetheless, the U.S. and Great Britain both contended that
earlier resolutions of the Security Council adopted in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 provided sufficient and continuing authority for the use of force.
They noted that after a number of resolutions in 1990 calling on Iraq to withdraw had
gone unheeded, the Council in Resolution 678, adopted on November 29, 1990,
authorized Member states “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area.”  They further noted that following Gulf
War I, the Council on April 3, 1991, adopted Resolution 687, which set forth
numerous obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of securing a cease fire,
including total disarmament and unconditional agreement not to develop or acquire
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related to them,
and that Iraq accepted those obligations.  Resolution 687, they also observed,
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specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including Resolution 678.
Noting that the Council had on numerous occasions – most recently in Resolution
1441 in the fall of 2002 – found Iraq to be in material breach of its disarmament
obligations and contending that it was in material breach of that resolution as well,
the U.S. and Great Britain argued that the use of force continued to be authorized to
remedy those breaches and to restore the conditions of the cease fire.  Thus, the
Attorney General of Great Britain in a legal opinion released on March 17, 2003, and
the White House in a report to Congress released on March 19, 2003, asserted that
“a material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force under
resolution 678.” 
Nonetheless, that was not the view of a number of Members of the Security
Council, including some of the permanent Members, or of many international legal
specialists.  They contended that the question of whether past Security Council
resolutions continue to authorize the use of force is for the Security Council to decide
and not individual Member states.  In particular, they noted that Iraq’s agreement to
the conditions of the cease fire, embodied in Resolution 687, was with the Security
Council and not with the Member states that had forced its withdrawal from Kuwait.
They further stressed that Resolution 1441, while deeming Iraq to be in “material
breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced
inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if
it continued to fail to meet its obligations.  They also emphasized that Resolution
1441 did not itself authorize Member states to use force but mandated that the
Council “convene immediately” in the event Iraq interfered with the inspections
regime or otherwise failed to meet its disarmament obligations.  Thus, they
concluded, Resolution 1441 contemplated that the use of force against Iraq would be
legitimate only upon the adoption of another resolution. 
In the absence of a judicial forum that might provide a final resolution of this
legal debate, what may be most significant is that both supporters and opponents of
the military action against Iraq  found it necessary, or at least advantageous, to argue
the legality of the action within the framework of the U.N. Charter.  Pronouncements
about the demise of that legal framework, in other words, may have been premature.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq
Crisis: A Brief Overview.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Texts – 1992-2002.
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism – International Law and the Use of Force,
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter141.html].
CRS-39
79 See H. Report 108-76 or Congressional Record, April 12, 2003, pages H. 3358-H. 3385
for bill and report language, and p. H. 3385-p. H. 3404 for debate in the House. By
unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to the conference report as long as the two leaders
concurred; see Daily Digest in Congressional Record, April 11 and Congressional Record,
April 12, 2003, p. S5392.
80 See CRS, General Distribution Memo, “Prior Administration Requests for Funding
Flexibility in Financing Military Operations;” available from CRS.  
Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated April 14, 2003)
On April 12, 2003, the House and Senate passed the conference version of the
FY2003 supplemental providing funding for the war with Iraq, foreign assistance,
homeland security and aviation assistance (H.Rept. 108-76).  Final Congressional
action was completed less than three weeks after the Administration’s request was
submitted shortly after the beginning of the war. The bill is likely to be signed by the
President soon.79  For a more detailed discussion of the FY2003 supplemental, see
CRS Report RL31829, Supplemental Appropriations FY2003: Iraq Conflict,
Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Security.
Final Congressional Action on the FY2003 Supplemental.   The
conference version of H.R. 1559 provides the $62.6 billion requested for the
Department of Defense for the war in Iraq, the continued U.S. presence in
Afghanistan, enhanced security at U.S. military bases, postwar occupation costs in
Iraq, and repair of equipment and replacement of munitions and equipment lost in the
war.  Of the $62.6 billion total, DOD requested $59.9 billion in the Defense
Emergency Response Fund (DERF), a transfer account where DOD can exercise
discretion about where the monies would be spent and then move the funds to the
appropriate account, and $2.6 billion for specified activities.  
That proposal has aroused considerable concern among many Members of
Congress.80  Although DOD provided Congress with estimates of where the funds
would be spent, these proposed allocations would not be binding.  In response to that
concern, the conference version of the bill distributes all but $15.7 billion of the
funds for DOD to regular appropriations accounts.  To give the additional flexibility
requested, Congress appropriated the $15.7 billion to a new Iraq Freedom Fund
where those funds can be spent as desired as long as DOD stays within certain
ceilings and floors set within the bill and gives five days advance notification of
transfers to the defense committees.  This approach blends the two different
approaches for allocating the funds more specifically devised by House and Senate
appropriators.
DOD Request and Congressional Action.  According to DOD’s
justification materials, the request assumed a “short but extremely intense” war and
covered deployment and re-deployment of forces and equipment, repair and
replenishment of equipment and munitions damaged or used during the war,
mobilization of reserve forces, special pays for active-duty forces, and a “lower-
intensity” operations phase after the war is over. The request also includes funds for
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the cost of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and enhanced security in the United
States for the remainder of the fiscal year.81
The request included several controversial proposals that broadened DOD’s role
in military  assistance including requests for $1.4 billion for aid to Pakistan, Jordan,
and other nations for logistical and military-related support; $150 million that DOD
could use to pay irregular or “indigenous” foreign military forces; and $50 million
for foreign military regular forces of unspecified countries who cooperate with the
U.S. in the “global war on terrorism.”  Although the Secretary of Defense would need
the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the aid to regular or irregular foreign
military forces, congressional oversight would be limited because reporting of
expenditures would be after the fact.82 The conference version required 15-day
advance notifications for the $1.4 billion in logistical and military support, eliminated
the Administration’s request for $150 million for irregular forces, and reduced the
$50 million for regular foreign military forces was reduced to $25 million and limited
that funding to counter terrorism training.
 In addition to funds for DOD, the Administration’s request includes $2.4 billion
for an Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund with the Administration retaining
flexibility both as to how to spend the funds and which agency would manage those
funds.  The prospect that much of these funds would be managed by  DOD, rather
than by USAID and the State Department as is the case for foreign assistance
programs, created controversy within the Administration, among American
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and internationally.  Critics
argue that military control of civilian operations would be inappropriate. The
conference version agreed to place the new Relief and Reconstruction Fund under the
control of the president, and permitted funds to be transferred to DOD reversing
earlier action by the House bill and Senate appropriators. The conference version,
however, requires that these funds be spent to carry out the purposes of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, and requires consultation prior to transfers and 5-day
advance notification to the appropriations committees before obligation of funds.83
The FY2003 supplemental also included specified requests for aid to 22
countries that have assisted the U.S. in some fashion in Iraq or the global war on
terrorism and that face economic and political risks because of the Iraqi war.  This
request totaled $4.7 billion.  Major recipients would include Jordan ($700 million),
Israel ($1 billion plus $9 billion in guaranteed loans), Turkey ($1 billion which could
be applied to $8.5 billion in loans), $325 million for Afghanistan, $300 million for
Egypt for grants or loan guarantees, and $200 million for Pakistan.  The conference
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version generally provides the funds requested by Administration but reduces the
request for Afghanistan to $167 million.84
 
The FY2003 supplemental only addresses costs for the war itself, initial
occupation, and replenishment of equipment and supplies for the remainder of the
fiscal year. The Administration’s request does not specify its assumptions about how
many or how long troops would remain deployed in Iraq as an occupation force after
the war is over, an issue that has aroused considerable controversy.  Some current and
retired Army leaders suggest that large numbers would be needed and that the
Army’s readiness could be affected (see Occupation, below).  To address the issue
of long-term costs, the Senate passed an amendment to the FY2004 budget resolution
that creates a $100 billion  reserve fund for the next 10 years to cover the cost of the
war in Iraq, to be financed by reducing the size of the tax cut by $10 billion annually
between 2003 and 2013. The House version of the FY2004 budget resolution does
not include this reserve fund, so this issue remains to be resolved in conference.85 
Estimates of the Total War and Post-war Costs.  Because of
uncertainties about both the course of the war itself and post-war needs, estimates of
the total cost of war and war-related costs by observers outside the Administration
range widely (see Table 1 below).  Some observers have emphasized that the cost for
the United States could be substantially higher than in the first Persian Gulf war
because U.S. allies are  unlikely to contribute to either the cost of the war itself or to
post-war occupation.86  The Administration is hopeful, however, that other countries
will contribute to postwar reconstruction of Iraq.87
The role of allies in postwar occupation is a particular concern of Army officials
who worry that if a large postwar occupation force is required for one or two years,
the readiness of  U.S. forces could be taxed.88  Estimates of the number of occupation
forces needed have ranged from 50,000-75,000, an estimate reportedly under
consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  to over 200,000, an estimate proposed by
both General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, and retired military and
other experts with recent experience in the Balkans or the 1991 Gulf war.89  The
Administration’s estimate appears to include funding for a relatively small
occupation force for six months.
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Members of Congress have cited concern about the effect of war costs on the
deficit.  If  war costs reach $100 billion in the first year, the FY2003 deficit would
increase by one-third from about $300 billion to $400 billion, setting a new record
in real terms (i.e. when adjusted for inflation) though still a smaller percent of the
GDP than in 1983.90 The effect of war costs on the deficit is part of the ongoing
debate on the FY2004 budget resolution. 
The full costs of a war with Iraq could include not only the cost of the war itself
but also the cost of aid to allies to secure basing facilities and to compensate for
economic losses (e.g. Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan), post-war occupation costs,
reconstruction costs, humanitarian assistance, and paying Iraqi government officials.
Post-war costs could be higher than the cost of the war itself according to the
estimates below.  Those estimates suggest war costs could range between $33 billion
and $60 billion, while the costs of aid to allies, occupation, reconstruction, and
humanitarian assistance could range between $35 billion and $69 billion  in the first
year depending on the size of the occupation force, the amount for aid to Allies, the
scope of humanitarian assistance, and the sharing of reconstruction aid.  Estimates
of total costs in the first year could range from about $68 billion to $129 billion. (see
Table 1 below). (The FY2003 supplemental covers costs for Iraq that begin with
initial deployment of forces in December 2002 and January 2003.) 
The Defense Department has not provided any official estimates of the potential
costs of a war with Iraq beyond FY2003, although Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
stated several weeks ago that $50 billion would be “on the high side.”91  The Office
of Management and Budget prepared an internal estimate, which reportedly projects
costs of $50-60 billion, but it did not issue the estimate publicly or explain the
assumptions underlying its projections. An earlier estimate by former chief White
House economist Larry Lindsey of $100 billion to $200 billion was dismissed by the
Administration.
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President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004, March 2003, p. 4; see
[http://www.cob.gov]. CBO’s methodology uses cost factors of the services. 
93 See [http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf]
94 See House Budget Committee, above,  and Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Backgrounder, Potential Cost of a War with Iraq and its Post-War Occupation
by Steven M. Kosiak, February 25, 2003 [http://www.csbaonline.org].
Table 1. Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq
(in billions of dollars )
Category Lower Enda Higher Endb
One or Two Month War  33.0 59.8
  War Only Subtotal 33.0 59.8
Occupation Force 19.0 38.8
Reconstruction 5.0 10.0
Aid to Allies 10.0 18.0
Humanitarian aid 1.2 2.4
  War-related Subtotal 34.6 69.2
  Total 67.6 129.0
Notes and Sources:
a Lower end reflects CBO revised estimate of cost of one-month war reflecting current deployments,
a 10 month occupation of 100,000 troops, the U.S. paying half of the U.N.’s estimate of $30
billion for reconstruction over three years, humanitarian aid for 10 % of the population, and $10
billion in aid to allies based on State Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War
Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” February 26, 2003. 
b Higher end estimate reflects House Budget Committee estimate of cost of a 250,000 force, a 10-
month occupation of 200,000 troops, the U.S. paying the full cost of reconstruction,
humanitarian aid for 20% of the population and $18 billion in aid to allies based on State
Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,”
February 26, 2003.
War Costs.  On the basis of current deployments, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) has published revised estimates of the costs of a war reflecting current
force deployments.  Using its assumptions, a one-month war would cost $33 billion
and a two-month war would cost $41 billion.92  Using a methodology based on the
costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Democratic staff of the House Budget
Committee estimated that a two-month war that deployed 250,000 troops would cost
$53 billion to $60 billion, an estimate closer to that used by Secretary Rumsfeld.93
An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) that
blends the two approaches, suggested that a two-month war would cost about $35
billion. A six-month war, with the same force size, could cost substantially more,
ranging from $50 billion using CBO’s figures to $85 billion using CSBA’s
approach.94  
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(continued...)
Related Aid to Allies.  The long-term cost of assistance to allies that could
be affected by the war  is uncertain.  The supplemental includes assistance requests
for the next 12 months but does not address any longer term cost issues.
Occupation.  The cost of a post-war occupation would vary depending on the
number of forces and the duration of their stay.  The FY2003 supplemental includes
$12 billion for “stabilization” costs for the remainder of FY2003, but it is not clear
what the Administration is assuming about troop levels.95  Using factors based on the
recent experience for peacekeepers, CBO estimated that monthly occupation costs
would range from $1.4 billion for 75,000 personnel to $3.8 billion for 200,000
personnel, a force size that was considered by the U.S. Central Command.96  A year-
long occupation force of 100,000 troops would cost $22.8 billion and a force of
200,000 troops would cost $45.6 billion using these factors.  That estimate was
recently buttressed by testimony from  the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric
Shinseki, stating his view that several hundred thousand troops could be needed
initially.97  Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz disavowed this estimate,
suggesting that a smaller U.S. force was likely and that Allies would contribute as
well. 
 An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pegged
the post-war occupation cost at $105 billion over 5 years, assuming an initial
peacekeeping force of 150,000 troops declining to 100,000 troops the second year
and 65,000 troops for the following 3 years.98 If the peacekeeping role were shared
with the U.N. or other nations, the costs to the United States would be lower. Press
reports suggest that the Administration is considering an occupation of about 2 years.
Reconstruction.  According to United Nations agencies, the cost of
rebuilding Iraq after a war could run at least $30 billion in the first 3 years.99  Nobel
prize-winning economist William D. Nordhaus has indicated that reconstruction in
Iraq could cost between $30 billion over 3 to 4 years, based on World Bank factors
used in estimating rebuilding costs elsewhere, to $75 billion over 6 years using the
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by Edward Nordhaus who estimates that a recession generated by an oil spike could cost the
U.S. economy $175 billion in the first year and $778 billion over the next ten years. 
If Iraqi oil fields are not substantially damaged, observers have suggested that
oil revenues could pay for occupation or reconstruction.  To help ensure that those
revenues would be available, the FY2003 supplemental includes a DOD request for
$489 million for a Natural Resource Remediation Fund to cover DOD costs for
emergency firefighting and repair of Iraqi oil wells to which other nations could also
contribute.101  Most of Iraq’s oil revenues, however, have been used for imports under
the U.N. Oil for Food Program or for domestic consumption.  Although expansion
of Iraqi oil production may be possible over time, additional revenues would not be
available for some time.  The only additional revenues available immediately might
be those from the estimated 400,000 barrels per day that Iraq currently smuggles and
that generate about $3 billion a year.102  
Humanitarian Assistance.  Estimates of post-war humanitarian assistance
for emergency food and medical supplies have been estimated at about $2.5 billion
the first year, and $10 billion over 4 years, assuming that about 20% of Iraq’s
population of 24 million needed help.103  If the number needing help were lower or
other nations or the U.N. contributed, the cost to the United States would be lower.
Economic Repercussions.  Some observers suggested before the war that
a conflict with Iraq could lead to a spike in the cost of oil generated by a disruption
in the supplies that could, in turn, tip the economy into recession, imposing major
additional costs on the U.S. economy.104  During the war itself, oil prices have
fluctuated widely.  For an analysis, see below, Oil Supply Issues.  
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The armed conflict in Iraq has raised concerns over the supply and price of
crude oil in world markets. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports
that Iraq held 112.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s
currently known reserves –  second only to Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels.
Despite holding such large reserves, Iraq’s pre-war rate of oil production is much
below its ultimate potential. With investment in facilities, technology, and better
operating methods, Iraq could rank as a top producer, a development that could
change world oil market dynamics.
Under the now-suspended Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP),  Iraq’s oil exports
varied greatly. In some weeks virtually no oil was exported, in others as much as 3.0
million barrels per day (mbd) entered world markets. On March 17, 2003, the U.N.
withdrew its staff from Iraq, leaving the program in limbo. Fighting in the southern
part of Iraq – source of roughly half the oil exported under the program – has caused
the halt of exports from the Persian Gulf port at Umm Qasr. The remainder of Iraq’s
exports, mainly produced in and around the Kirkuk field in the north, had been
shipped via twin pipelines across Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
Tanker loadings there reportedly halted shortly after the fighting began because of
vessels’ unwillingness to call. Storage facilities at Ceyhan are virtually full, and the
pipeline has likely stopped shipping. Conditions in the northern oil fields near
Kirkuk, where this oil is produced, are not clear at this update, although it does
appear that damage to wells and infrastructure is minimal. 
 On average, prior to the onset of fighting, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program
reported that exports  averaged 1.7 mbd under the OFFP.   In addition, Iraq likely
supplied another 400,000 barrels to adjacent countries outside the U.N.-run program
as well as producing for internal consumption. Despite the off-and-on nature of Iraq’s
international oil flow, the oil market  relied on Iraqi supply, and it played a role in the
determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-consumer arrangements. Iraq
accounted for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not participate in
the cartel’s quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi exports have
been controlled by the U.N.  The U.N. has expressed an interest in restarting the Oil-
for-Food Program as soon as is practical, and Security Council Resolution 1472 of
March 28, 2003, authorized the program under U.N. administration through May 12.
(For further information, see above, Post-War Governance Issues and
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Humanitarian Issues.)  It is too early to predict, however, when Iraqi exports might
resume, under whose auspices, and in what quantity they may flow.  
Crude prices recently touched $40 per barrel, equaling levels reached during
1990-1991. The price spike resulted from supply difficulties due to an oil workers’
strike in Venezuela, as well as overriding concerns about Persian Gulf oil supply. The
Venezuelan strike, which began on December 2, 2002, seems at least partially
resolved; oil exports appear to be slowly approaching pre-strike amounts, although
it is not clear if and when old levels might be re-attained. But tribal violence in
Nigeria, another important world market supplier, has resulted in output cuts as much
as 800,000 barrels per day. These intermittent difficulties present add variables to the
international oil supply shortfall situation, where Iraq is the largest component.
War jitters about crude supply appear to ebb and flow. But the cessation of
exports from Iraq, and Venezuelan and Nigerian supply concerns have combined to
create volatile market conditions. Prices, which have fallen from March highs, now
range in the mid-to-upper $20s.  Were the supply shortfalls from Venezuela and
Nigeria to continue through spring, and Iraq’s crude oil supply  remain shut-in,
OPEC members–who upped output by nearly 2 million barrels per day to offset the
impact of Iraq–would be hard pressed to make up further crude supply losses. Were
events in the Persian Gulf, Nigeria or Venezuela to adversely effect the availability
of petroleum for the world market, a genuine oil shortfall of significant proportion
would result, with dramatic impact on supply and price. At this update, as noted,
prices are well off recent highs, but oil markets are extremely volatile and prices can
fluctuate markedly depending on events and their interpretation.
For the longer outlook, under a future Iraqi government, the country could have
the resources to become a much larger oil producer, increasing world supply and
changing the oil price paradigm that has prevailed since the Iranian political upheaval
of 1978-1979.  This eventuality could unleash a new set of political and economic
forces in the region; it could also change the complexion of the world oil market by
enhancing future crude oil availability.
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Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at 
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
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Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products 
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Military Deployments
For information on U.S. armed forces deployed in connection with the Iraq
crisis, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces.
Humanitarian Aid Organizations and Iraq
CRS Report RL31766, Iraq, United Nations and Humanitarian Aid
Organizations.
Iraq Facts 
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources.  The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
The following CRS page focuses on official sources, including sources in both
the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted  Resolution 1441,  holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations.  For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
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For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.
